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THE ATTAIN~.·
The assize of novel disseisin ·originally lay against the disseisor in
possession fo favor of the disseisee, and was soon extended to the
heir of -the disseisee, but not against the heir· or grantee of the disseisor. But the disseisor might be dead or might have conveyed the
land, and in such a case the disseisee would be driven to the writ
. of right with its delays and chance of battle. But the cases where
the defendant had come into possession under a lawful title which
·· was limited in time and had ceased to exist, i.. e., cases where there
was no disseisin except constructive but an unlawful retention of.
possession were also wholly unprovided for. The judges and their
clerks were busy remedying these defects, and they invented what
came to be called writs .of entry. They were given to the claimant
out of possession, and like the assize, the writ defined the issue. The
writs, without noticing the Quibus, were of two kinds: (I) where
the seisin of defendan!: in possession originated lawfully, as in cases
of discontinuance and deforceme.nt, and ( 2) where his seisin originated unlawfully ~s in cases of abatement, intrusion and disseisin.
All the writs defined the issue by saying that the defendant in possession "has not entry except through" (non habet ingressum nisi
per) a cer.tain person and then stated the defect in the title.
Against the disseisor the novel d.isseisin lay. But against the
. grantee (foeffee) or heir the writ was invented, assigning no entry
except through (per) a certain person who disseised plaintiff or. his
ancestor. Next, it was extended to the heir's or grantee's heir or
grantee by the phrase "no entry except through" (per) a certain person to whom (cui) the disseisor granted or who was the disseisor's·
heir. Here the writs stopped; they would not go beyond the third
party inclusive (u.sque ad tcrtiam pcrsonam inclusivam), 28 according to Bracton. The reason given was that the writ would be going
back to a time as to which the jury could not' be expec,ted to know
the facts. But almost while Bracton was writing astatute29 extended the remedy beyond the third person from the disseisor to any
. one who tame in after (post) the disseisin if under the disseisor's
a Continued from the November issue.
. '" The word "inclusive" means including the disseisor at one end and the heir's or
grantee's heir or grantee at the other end. See 2 Pollock and Maitland 62, which is
confusing in speaking of a fourth degree as to which there is no reason, and 3 Holds·
worth's Hist. of Eng. Law, 8 is not very clear. The writs taken from the register arc
printed in 3 Holdsworth, 497.
'"Statute of Marlborough, cap. 29 (1267).
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seism. And so the. writs were called in the Per, in the Per and Cui,
and in the Post.
Now it is apparent that these writs of entry could be converted
into· a writ of right if the defendant could admit his entry under
the circumstances stated in the writ and plea.d, by saying he had
better right than the plaintiff. This would have ousted the wri.t of
right and trial by grand assize and the Nonnan's claim of the battle.
Naturally, therefore, the defendant was limited (1) to denying the
right of entry assigned to him. He could not plead an inception of
title older than that assigned. If he denied the entry assigned and
the jury found his denial true., he won the case. But he could also
( ~) admit the right of entry assigned to himself by plaintiff and
plead matter subsequent in time to the inception of the entry assigned. In this way the writs of entry were kept possessory and did
not oust the proprietary writ of right.
The judges in inventing these writs and forms of .action, forced
the plaintiff to· say in his pleading that he put himself, as to his cla.4n,
upon the country, i.e., a jury. And the defendant, in order to plead
in denial was foi:ced to say that he also put himself upon the country, or if he pleaded new matter in avoidance, the plaintiff in denying
put himself on the country as to the new matter, and the defendant
did likewise and so on. Thus early begq.n the conclusion of the
common law declaration and the similiter and the rule that a pleading alleging new matter concluded with a verification, but if it simply denied or traversed, it concluded .to the country. But the imposition of the jury was enforced also in all other actions where it
could be used, especially in the various actions of trespass and a
little later in trespass on the case, as well as in debt and detinue.
All this was judicial legislation of the most enlightened kind. But
it was plain that as to the petty assizes, the twelve men were imposed
by governmental authority; while as to the jury the ostensible reason for their presence was an agreement of the parties.
To apply this situation now to the attaint, we notice that the attaint was not given as to the jury verdicts but only as to those of
the assizes. The difference in procedure was plain. The writ of
assize defined the issue and called the defendant into court along
with the twelve. While the other process required preliminary
pleading, a defining of the is.sue and a venire facias for the jury
after a definite ·issue was made. Bracton says that the attaint does
not lie against a jury because both parties have agreed to submit the
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controversy to the proof by the jury and no one should be heard to
attack the twelve witnesses whom he has agreed
be bound by.80
But this is IlO reason at all. The twelve in the assize and the •twelve
on the venir~ were selected by the sheriff. The parties did no.t name
them or any particular twelve witnesses. The fact was that the
judges felt Uiat having forced the parties to jury witnesses, they
could not stultify their own work by allowing an assault upon the.
witness~. Probably back of it •all was the- feeling that an attaint
prolonged the litigation. It is to ithe interest of the state that there
be an _end to litigation, is a maxim of great power in English law.
··. So despite the fa~ that there was just· as much necessity for an attaint in case of jury ~s in case of assize, the judges were not prepared to extend the common law remedy for attaint to the new field.
The same thought of not. prolonging litigation underlay the selfeyident p~oposition, which seems strange to legal au1hors, that the
writ of attaint was not issued of course (de curstt-) out of the chancery, but by special indulg~nce. of the king. This does not mean
that the king personally, as a matter of partiality, granted it when
he pleased, but rather that the application was made in the chancery
and the officers there, after a snowing and a eonsultation with the
judges, issued the writ, or did not issue it as seemed best. It would
have seemed as intolerable then as it would be today tha.t a litigant,
as a matter of course, as soon as a verdict was returned against him,
could allege a false oath and at once have a jury of twenty-four
knights to pass anew on ithe issue. The verdict then and now was
prima facie correct. The law could not in reason provide that the,
incorrectness of the verdict should at once be assumed and writ of
attaint at once issued. A showing was required, and very reasonably
required before it would be issued.
.
·A statute was passed at once that made short work of Bracton's
fanciful reason for discrimination. By Westminster !,31 which was
one of Edward I's great reforming statutes, it was provided "that
henceforth the king of his· office shall grant attaints upon inquests
in plea· of land or of franchise or of thing touching the freehold
when it shall seem to him that there is need." The same restraint
upon the issuance of the writ is shown here. The writ does not go

to

ao Bracton :zgob. The explanation in 2 Pollock and Maitland, 621, that the jurors
were like the witnesses in wager of law, seems fancifuL Men as acute as the lawyers
of that day knew the difference. Soon the judges were calling the witnesses in wager
ot law a lot of rascals.
11 Cap. 3S:
Purvue est que de soresmes le Rei de son office dorra atentes sur les
enquestcs en plai de tcrre ou de franchise ou de chose que touche fraunk tenement
quant iL lui semblera quc besoigne seit.
·
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as a matter of course,82 but, to the king, i.e., to his judicial officers,
it must be shown that there is need and the proof made must make
a very strong showing of incorrectness in the verdict. In this .respect the writ of attaint is exactly parallel to the present motion for
a new trial. This statute was construed as e..'-.i:ending (as no doubt
it was intended) the remedy of attaint to the verdicts of jurors.
The popularity of the attaint is now manifest and in a few years the
author of ·the Mirror8 8 will be clamoring to issue the writ of attaint
out of the chancery without difficulty in order to attaint- all false
jurors in all kinds of actions, personal, real or mixed. The tendency
to assume that a remedy, which works well when carefully guarded
and applied, will be good in· all cases when taken as a matter of
course, is an incorrigible tendency of the human mind.
·
This statute does·not speak of damages given in attaint. It gives
the writ as it had been used, and damages were a part of the remedy by the common law, and both at the common law and under the
statute of Westminster I, the damages of the plaintiff in the attaint
were recoverable,3 ' and there never seems to have been any hesitation in calling upon the jury of twenty-four to fix the damages of the
plaintiff in the attaint when he prevailed. Likewise there never
seems to have been any hesitation in giving the plaintiff in attaint
full compensation for all that he had been compelled to pay by way
of damages, amercement and costs by reason of the attainted verdict and judgment. It is a common feature of the proceeding.
But ·there is a question of damages midway between the reversal
of the·judgment and its affirmance. It may be that a party desires
to say that while he does not dispute the verdict against him in the
principal matter of the verdict, he wishes to allege that the amount
of damages given against him was too large. In our motion
new
trial, this is the ground of excessive damages. In the mediaeval law
such damages were called "outrageous." Orig"inally Bracton had
stated that there could be no attaint in respect of the damages alone.8 "
But in time the common law in its expansive powers made the practice of attaint meet this necessity, by giving the attaint for ~:>Ut·
rageous damages. The first mention of this matter is a warning of

for

82 Coke's contention that this statute made the writ " matter of course is wholly untenable and it is strange that his extreme partisanship should not have seen the obvious
objections to such a situation.
n Mirror of Magistrates (Set. Soc.) 164•
.. The cases in Bracton's Note Book show that the party injured by the false ver·
diet obtains the ·seisin he has lost and the damages that he has paid on the former
verdict as well as his damages by being disseised under the false verdict.
as Bracton 29ob. No attaint as to damages alone was evidently the practice as
shown by Berwick's words below.
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the judge to a jury in the year 1304 Berwick, Justice,88 tells the
j~ry to find the damages of plaintiff, but warns them to be careful,

for the attaint "nowadays" lies upon the damages. The practice
w.as then evidently well settled; how long -it had been in operation
cannot be said.
But:the·fu.w in its method was as practical as it is today. If the
plaintiff, paving recovered excessive ·damages, released all above
a certain sum, a false oath could not be assigned on the damages
. released,81 although by the confession of the party and by his re.. lease, rthe falseness of the verdict as to'the damages was admitted.
· But the lawyers did ~ot readily give up their attempt to hold the
jury responsible for excessive damages, and as late as the reign of
Henry VI.I ( 1499) the aggrieved party was attempting to prevent
the jury from obtaining the defence of a plaintiff's release,38 iust as
at the present time excessive damages are urged to show that the
jury has been influenced by passion' or prejudice in passing on the
issues. ·
·
Difficulties in pleading the false verdict as to the excessive damages were bound to arise~ and i~· one .of the Year Books39 a iustice
sugge~ts a method of assigning the false verdict in trespass to goods,
by saying that the party could allege .that the goods were of a cer-.
tain V<!-lue and no more and in all the damages iiven above that value
there was a 'false oatlt.. The court in the early period .could either
reduce or increase the damages, a power ~nder the common law
which cour:ts have lost, but no false 9ath could be assigned either
· regarding the damages as increased or the damages as ·reduced by
• Y. B. 30·31, Edward I (Rolls Ser.) u4. Thayer (Treat. Evid. 147>' understands
this pr~ceeding aga~st exce5sive damages to rest on the statute of W~tininster I of.'
1275. But this cannot be true. The authority is the other way. Y. B. Pasch, 3 Henry '
IV; pt 3-, Cpke 2 In~t. J30, Brooke Abridg., Attaint, .µ.
ary. B. 12 Edward IV, 56; Y. B. 14 Henry VII, 5.
as Y. B. 14 Henry VII, i. 5, I I on a writ of attaint Sergeant Yaxley assigned the
false oath in this, that the jury had assessed the damages in an action of trespass to
the person (trans de battery) excessively (trope outrageousment). Yaxley argued, in
answer to Keble's statement that the plaintiff had released six pounds of the ten pounds
damages, that it was iiot reasonable that the act of the plaintiff should C.'CCUse the jury's
false oath. But Fineu...., C. J., held that loss was the basis of attaint.
• Y. B. 12 Edw. IV, 56; F,itzh. Att. u. If a man recover excessive (outrageous)
damages in trespass and the plaintiff releases parcel of the damages, the false oath can·
not be assigned by the defendant if he brings attaint as to those damages released, for
as to them he is not aggrieved, and one of the justices said that he could assign a
false oath in this form, to·wit: that the goods were worth forty shillings or other sum
which would be the true value in fact and if the damages assessed (taxes) were beyond
that sum, he could' assign the false oath in the excess and it was clearly agreed that,
as to costs, no attaint lies. This statement as to costs must be understood as meaning
the amount of costs, since they were fixed by the clerks.
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the court!0 .This last case seems to suggest that in attaint a party
prevailing could assign, as a false oath, that the damages were too
small. Theoretically and practically there would be no difficulty. in
this proceeding and probably such cases existed but I have found
none. Under our new trial practice, the only way in which a court
can rectify insufficient damages, is by granting a new tFial with a
venire de novo, but the attaint met no such difficulty.
The inhibition against assigning an attaint upon the action of the
judge during the trial in regard to damages, directs attention '1:o another matter. We have noticed the case in Bracton's Note Book
where a jury was attainted although forced to certain verdict by
the erroneous action of the justices. But it was soon settled that the
jury could not be made responsible for the act of the judge unless
they had rendered a general verdict on the whole issue by incorporating the judge's bad law into their verdict. 'l'hus it was'very early
held that if the jury find a special verdict and ref er the matter of
law, as rto whether there was a disseisin to the court and the matter
of law be incorrectly decided by the court, no attaint lies against
the jury for this is not their default but that of the court, yet if in
~he special verdict a matter be found falsely, attaint lies upon that
matter.41 Thus early the distinction between judicial error and ·a
false verdict emphasized the :witnessing and ignored the judicial
function of the jury.
After the passage of the statute of \Vestminster I in r275 it seems
to have been held that the attaint was applied to the verdicts of
juries ·involving the freehold, although as to this there has been
doubt expressed.42 It may be that a natural disinclination of the
judges to extend the attaint led to a narrow construction of the statu,te. Perhaps they held that the word "inquests" did not include
juries. The Mirror seems to say that attaints lay only as to assizes,
but the available evidence is the other way.· About this time and
before the passage of any other statute, it is found that the chief
justice in an eyre can grant writs of attaint as to verdicts of assizes
or juries given in that eyre without any recourse being had to the

a

40 Y. B. 9 Henry VI, 2b.
Today a court cnn force a reduction of damages by the
new trial. But the remittitur is the party's act in theory. Thus we see the "good old
fiction" still in active operation. But the court should have the correlative power to
increase the damages. Generally speaking, the only help for a party who claims dam·
ages given to be inadequate, is to submit to a new trial.
41 43 Ass. 41, Rolle Abridg: Att. (K) 2. This situation must have led to special
verdicts. 3 Reeves, Hist. of Eng. I.aw (Finlason ed) 304, note (a) is incorrect in saying that no attaint lay on a special verdict. The case of Scoland v. Grandison, I Y. B.
Eyre of Kent, infra, is a case of special verdict where the attaint was allowed.
"Y. B. 3 Eyre of Kent (Se!. Soc.) Introd. p. xi, viL
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chancery. ·The chief justice in eyre could act only through his power
delegated by the king in the articles of eyre and hence it must have
been true that the king out of the chancery could grant writs of attaint upon verdicts of juries/3 if the judges could do so.
In the· Year Book of the Eyre of Kent is found a picture of an
actual trial as it took place, for ~ ~e seems to be accurately re-,
potted. In explanation of the W<?rd eyre, which is the Latin iter,
it may lie said that once in so many years the king's justices, under
articles of •eyre, were ins.tructed to visit a. certain county and try all
the cases there, both civil and criminal and make investigation into
all 9erelictions by .individuals or public bodies. The visitation was
considered ~ oppressive thing and at one time was limited to take
place not more than once in seven years. In the year 1312 and 1313
the king's justices were holding such an eyre in the county of Kent.
Sometime before the. eyre William de Grandison had brought a
novel disseisin against Frcmk de Scoland, complaining that Frank
had unjustly and without judgment disseised him. The trial turned
upon an estate tail. These estates in tail had been created by the
statq.te D_e Donis." The statute probably adopted an older writ for
a remedy and the judges devised three actions called fom1edon.
' (forme done or forma doni) to enforce the statute. If the heir in
~il s~ed he used the formedon in the descender, the remainderman
brought formedon in the remainder. and-the reversioner would bring
a formedon in the reverter. All these writs were necessarily based
upon a deed which had created a fee tail and w~re on the title.
The facts as developed w~re .that Frank de Scoland was the heir
of .Geoffrey ·de Scoland, an· U:ncle. The uncle Geoffrey had an .megitima~e son Richard, and the father gave to this son an estate tail
in certain land. It was useless, of course, to grant him more, as a
l>astard could have only heirs of the bOdy. 'l'his gift left Geoffrey
owner of the reversion in fee. which would descend to Frank, his lawful heir. Richard died with~ut heirs of the body after Geoffrey, the
•There is an assertion of ~ a power by Berwick, Justice, in Y. B. 30·31 Ed·
ward I, 124, who says, "There may be an attaint 011 the damages out of this court
without the ,need of seeking it in the chancery." The note in the Eyre Year Boole is
carelessly made. On page 138 of Y. B., 3 Eyie of Kent (Set. Soc.) it is said that upon
all disseisins (verdicts or assizes?) the attaint may be had without a writ from the
chancery. On· page 205, Id. the note is that the chief justice can grant by his own
writ an attaiut upon any assize taken in the eyre. But the Y. B. 20·21 Edward I,
some years before the Eyre of Kent Year Book, lays it down without qualification, that
the juetices in eyie can grant an attaint without a writ from the chancery. Y. B. 20-21
Edward I (Rolls Ser.) 108. The matter is of little importance on acconnt of the
statute of 13a6 which was soon to be passed, but the con~lusion that attaiuts upon verdicts of juries were covered by the statute seems to be warranted.
"State of Westminster II, cap. 1 (1285).
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father, had died, and Frank, as the heir of Geoffrey, owner of the
reversion, entered. But the lord of the fee was William de Grandison of whom Geoffrey held the land and he also had entered, claiming an escheat in this way: he said that Geoffrey, the father, after
he had granted the fee tail to his bastard son Richard, had released
the reversion in fee also to Richard, so that Richard, by merger of
the fee tail in the reversion, had become the owner in fee of the land
and he, being incapable of having general heirs and leaving no heirs
of the body had left the estate without any one to inherit and hence
it would escheat to .the one of whom it was held, namely, William
de Grandison, the lord of the fee. The assize found in favor of the
release by a special verdict reciting the deed and the release and the
facts.
Frank de Scoland now relying upon advice that formedon was a
higher action than a novel disseisin, whicp. tried the possession, and
believing a jury would find no release, brought before this eyre a
formedon in the reverler.4 s The defendant Grandison now orally
pleaded in bar ithe judgment in novel disseisin as res judicata. Gilbert de Touthby, a celebrated serjeant, replying, said: "This formedon is a higher action on the title and is not upon the possession."
As a matter of fact, however, the jury in the novel disseisin had
found the deed and release· specially and this issue was on the title
and the issue on the £orinedon would be precisely the same as defined in the special verdict, namely, was there a release in fee by
Geoffrey t~ the dead Richard. So Grandison's counsel said that
Frank!s remedy was by attaint, for as long as that judgment stood
it was a bar.46 Spigurnel, Justice, answered Touthby: "What you
say, Gilbert, would be well enough if the assize had simply found a
verdict of seised and disseised but they have by special verdict found
all the facts as to title and upon them the justices hav~ awarded the
disseisin. Wherefore, if the attaint jury says that they had made a
false oath concerning the release, the verdict of the assize would be
sufficiently attainted by it appearing that "'William was not disseised."
It begins to be apparent that i~ the issue in the possessory action is
on the title, the court will consider the issue as what was actually
passed upon. Here it is plain that the issue tried by the possessory
assize was not possession but property. The possessory action of
.. Y. B. 2 Eyre of Kent (Sel. Soc.) 189, 193, 197·
.. In Y. B. 21-22 Edward I (Rolls Ser.) 428, a woman brought a writ of right and
it was pleaded against her that she had brought a novel desseisin and the verdict and
judgment were .against her, therefore attaint WM her remedy. But the defendant after
making the objection pleaded over for the pleasure of the justices (pour le pleer des
justices).
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as.s!z.e had been in effect as much proprietary as the writ of right or
the fonnedon on the deed. Thus Frank was non-suited.
He now proceeded to London and must have shown the officials
in the chancery that the release was a fraud, for he returned with a
writ of attaint.'7 The sh~riff summoned Grandison, the defendant
in attaint, also the jury in the assize and the twenty-four law worthy
.(legales) knights. The writ assigned, generally, a false oath made
by the twelve of the assize. Grandison and seven of the jury appeared, two of the jury were distrained and three were dead. Frank de
Scoland's serjeant first stated the particulars wherein the oath was
false (I) in finding the release, ( 2) in finding that Richard held of
Grandison and did .homage to Grandison and (3) in the matter of
damages. The defendant Grandison ·was now ordered to state any
reason why the attaint should not be taken.
The oral pleas for Grandison began. First the objection was made
that all the twelve were not present. This was,overruled as a matter of course, the law being that de~th of jurors did not destroy the
remedy. The proposition that it did is as astonishing as would be
a plea in bar by one burglar ithat his partner in crime was dead.
Next it was objected that the judgment in the novel disseisin had
never. been executed by the payment of the damages and costs. This
plea, was disproven by inspection of the record. The next objection
was tliat ·the writ of attaint was not presented at the opening of the
eyre as required by the articles of the eyre. This was ·overruled,
because the justices in the eyre could grant attaints themselves. Here
one of the counsel for Grandison asked for a· bill of exception on
this plea,'8 but one of the justices replied: "We will make no -bill,
but you have the testimony of the whole court, so lodge your exception." Finally it was objected that the tenant of.the land, the grantee
Df Grandison s~nce the verdict in the assize, was made a party to the
attaint, but had not been a party to the assize, and he was therefore
not a proper party. This objection was overruled for the tenant was
liable for the damages accruing since the assize.
_Thereupon Hartlepool for Grandison said to the court: "By your
leave we will impart (consult) with the twelve of the first disseisin,"
"Y. B. I E;yre of Kent (SeL Soc.) 158, 160.
"This proves that the Statute of Westminster II, cap. 31, which gives a bill of
exceptions, was applicable originally to pleas offered in oral pleading and refused by
the cotirt. It had nothing to do with exceptions as we have them, for an exception
then was a· plea. See 13 Michigan Law Rev. 457 for an e."<planation of the whole matter of the early meaning of a bill of e..'tceptions. The word exception in the statute and
above means the pleadi.ng offered, not an objection reserved upon it. The translator has
wholly mistaken the point by using objection for exception. He was to lodge his exception or plea written out.
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i.e., the accused assize. Staunton, Justice, replied: "Pray do so."
The defendants withdraw and return and ·now a new objection is
made, that the false oath was assigned as to the release, tenqre,
homage and damages, but not to the whole issue of seisin and disseisin. Spigurnel-ruled shortly: "All findings of fact are open to
be attainted." And the defendant having exhausted his objections,
the oath was administered to one of the twelve and to the others, one
by one in succession. An oath was too solemn a ceremony to be
administered in our method, to the whole jury toge~er. Each juryman said: "Hear, ye Justices, I will speak the truth of this assize
and of the freehold of which I have had the view by command of
the king, and of the oath of the twelve and in naught will I fail."
Thereupon Spigurnel, the chief justice Qf the eyre, ·recited to the
attaint jury the pleadings at the assize and the verdict of the twelve,
and charged the twenty-four knights to say whether the twelve had
made a false oath or not, in so far as they said· that Geoffrey released to Richard all his right and that Richard held of Grandi:;on
and did homage to Grandison and in the matter of damages. . The
twenty-four said that the twelve made a false oath, (I) as to the
release, (2) as to the damages and (3) as to Richard holding of
Grandison but not as to the homage. The judges at once ruled that
the homage was immaterial because not owed. Then Spigurnel said:
"Gentlemen, (bons gents),49 tell us Frank's damages since the assize." The jury answered, "Seven score marks." Thereupon Frank
was given his seisin, his damages of fifteen marks paid at the first
assize,. with his amercement and costs and one hundred and forty
marks further damages. The n.ine jurors were ordered to prison,
but they paid fines of from one to forty pounds.
·
This actual picture of an attaint trial shows a remarkably business-like way of holding court and differs from a trial today only
in ·two particulars: first, ·the pleadings are oral, stated to the court
and if disallowed are not part of the record; and second, no evidence whatever is offered but the jury answer as witnesses out of
their own knowledge. \Ve see none of the interminable objections
to evidence, nor do the serjeants·for the respective parties make any
statements to the jury.
·
Attaint was now a remedy g1:"Clwing in popularity. Wisely guarded, it was a desirable method of reversing an injustice. Bu.t soon
one safeguard was removed by tlie statute of I326. r.o ·False verdicts

a

••The transiator of the Year Books translates "Bons gents" "good people." It is
needless to say that twenty-four knights would not be addressed as if they were ordinary
jurymen.

.. Stat. x Edward III, cap. 6.
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were probably nt.imerous. Ignorance, prejudice or improper influence then, as now, would be certain to influence or to be used with
a jury, and litigants naturally claimed that they were entitled to the
attaint as a matter of right without making any preliminary showing in the chancery. Official discretion then as now was supposed
to cover, and then as now did cover, much partiality and unfairness.
The statute recites "greaJI: mischiefs, damages, and destruction of
divers persons, as well as of the men of holy church by the false
oa~h of 'jurors in writs of trespass!; and then it is enacted that the
writ of attaint be allowed for the principal matter and also for damages in trespass, and the chancellor is to grant such wri.ts without
speaking to the.king: Behind this statute we can see the great ecclesiastical land-owners distraining upon their tenants and being
su~d in trespass for damages, and then appearing in cour:t to face a
hostile jury. The action of trespass has now entered upon its victorious career as trespass on the case, trespass on the case on promises (assumpsit), trover and conversion and trespass in ejectment
whereby i!f: was to cover almost the whole field of legal remedy. The
.statute did nothing new in giving the remedy as to the principal
issue as w.ell as to the damages, but it was new in the two respects
of gi~ng the remedy in a'n actions of trespass and of providing for
the writ as a matter of course out of the chancery. Henceforth any
one dissatisfied with a verdict could appeal to the attaint without
making any preliminary showing as to the probable falseness of a
verdict. It was still plain to the legislaiture an~ the courts that the
jur.y were only witnesses to, not judges of, the fact.
The remedy continued to grow in popularity. But the theory was
to give it only in cases where the damages exceeded forty shillings
both on 'bills and writs· of trespass.c1 This was a temporary expedient for in 1354 the limit was reinoved.112 In the meantime the
clamor continued for the attaint in all cases113 until at last the author
of the Mirror's wish came true, and in 13t5o the remedy of attaint
was granted as a matter of course in all pleas, real and personal.H
If Andrew Horn wrote the Mirror, he was a reformer before hi~
time, but like most reformers he had taken a thing good under certain circu'mstances and by removing restraints upon its use had put
it in the way of destruction. The opposite side of the picture was
pres~nt to the judges. Verdicts assaulted as a matter of course,
finality of decisio~s disturbed ,by any dissatisfied litigant led to the
11 Stat. s Edward III, cap. 7•
.a Stat. 28 Edward III, c:ap. 8.
a Thayer, Treat. :i;:vid., 14&
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allowance of dilatory proceedings against the writ. Where there
were so many defendants, there was no limit to the delay.
The legislature tried to remedy the defect. The finding on a plea
of one defendant was made to apply to all. But still "great, fearless
and shameless perjury horribly continues and increases daily among
common jurors of the realm," and the legislature turned to the e..'C- ·
pedient of increasing the qualifications of_ the attaint jurors.55 This
seems to be a strange expedient: ·There would have been some relevancy in increasing the qualifications of petty jurors, but the qualifications of attaint jurors were already high. The word knights
was not a mere name. It called for a particular class of the gentryA
But it was the old difficulty of attempting to make people honest by
legislation. No safeguards were provided for the deliberations of
the twelve jur0rs. They made up the verdict as they pleased. There
were no means of correcting their findings by the court. The jury
were, in theory, still witnesses and the only witnesses, and their
verdict was a finality to the court. Bribery was, no doubt, a common
incident. Govemmen,t was growing weaker under Henry VI and
this was the situation when the Wars of the Roses began in 146o,
with the consequent unsettling of the ordinary affairs of life.
The courts, in the meantime, had been working with the proceeding by attaint. They found no difficulty in moulding the judgment
so as to apportion the damag-es among the defendants.56 Their attitude is reflected in the ruling that if a deed was set up and the
witnesses to the deed were .added to the jury,· a proceeding that was
the corollary of the jury of twelve witnesses and 1:he result of the
parties putting themselves upon the witnesses to the deed, there
could be no attaint, because the witnesses to the deed upon whose
information it was assumed the ·jury acted, could not be attainted.157
This points dearly to the time when witnesses do not testify to the
jury.but must be added to the jury. But the jury might find against
the deed and in that case it was held that the jury could be attaint"' Stat. 34 Edward Ill, cap. 7.
11 Thayer, Treat. Evid. 149.

"' Y. B. Mich. 46 Edward III, pl. 5.
"'Y. B. 20·21 Edward I (Rolls Ser.) 108; Y. B. n-1~ Edward III (Rolls Ser.) 338.
Fitzh. Att. 26. At the Michaelmas term, II Ed. III, Sharshulle, Justice, said openly,
that in case the witnesses to a deed are joined to the twelve, one shall never have
attaint because the twelve cannot be attainted if the witnesses are not attainted and
they shall not be because they are sworn to speak to their knowledge, while the jury
are to speak the truth outright (a tout atrench). Fitzh. Att. 6 refers to a case in 6
Henry VI where the witnesses were dead. Coke, 2 Inst. 662 says that attaint lies if
found no deed, but not where found a deed if the witnesses are joined to the jury.
Rolle Abridg. Attaint (A) 14 to the same effect..
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ed.58 Then it was held that if a party had any other remedy than the
attaint, if he could make the question he desired to be settled the
basis of a cause of action, he could not have attaint. 69 So if in the
litigation a fact was admitted to be true, no attaint lay upon the
verdict as to that fact. 00 So it was held as to an immaterial fact
or in regard to surplusage ;61 but if issue was joined as to a fact and
the fact was found, whether it was immaterial or not, a,ttaint lay
upon the verdict. 62
Of the attempt that was made to claim an attaint pending as a
.supe1·sedeas the cour,t made short work. The argument was, no
doubt, that it would be unconscionable to enforce the judgment
when it. was alleged that the verdict was false, but the courts held
to the proposition that the judgment was good until it was reversed
by attaint. 63 The law was strict in holding that no one not a party
to the verdict sought to be attainted, unless he be the heir or executor, could bring the attaint. The idea has profoundly affected the doctrine of res jiedicata. Passeley, whom the court in a Year Book addresses as a ·"legist," ( i. c., one acquainted with the R9man Law)
.says that the reason why one not a party to a judgment may by
.averment, i.e., by parol, adduce matter contrary to the fact established by the judgm~t, is ~hat no one not a party to a verdict can
bring attaint up.on it. 04 Thus we have the. original of the rule that
judgments not in rem conclude parties and privies but not strangers.
Likewise it was said in a Year Book that no attaint lies upon wager
• See preceding note. What was done when the witnesses testified against the deed
.and the jury believed them?
.. Fitzh. Att. 4- At the Trinity Term 6 Henry VI where false oath was assigned
in two things and it appeared that the party had a cause of action for them, by advice
-of all of the judges, he was denied attaint.
"Y. B. 11 Henry IV, 27. Rolle Abridg. Att. (I) 5. In trespass the defendant
pleaded in abatement the misnomer of the viii in which the venue was laid. the old
rule was that if a man pleaded in abatement and he lost the judgment was quod recu·
peret. This was the law in Illinois until recently. The issue on the venue was found
against the party, but the jury also found the defendant guilty of trespass and it was
held that attaint did not lie upon the finding of guilty of trespas~, since that was ad·
mitted by the plea in abatement and could not have been in issue.
·
11 Y. B. 14 Edward III (Rolls Ser.), 28; Rolle Abridg. Attaint (D) 1, 2.
"'Y. ll. ·12 Henry VI, 6b.
a Y. B. 2 Henry IV, 18; Y. B. 2·3 Edward II (Se!. Soc.), 157· In a quare impedit
·against an abbot wherefore he impeded Bigot in his presentation, a judgment was given
for Bigot. Then the abbot brought an attaint but Bigot died before the attaint was
taken. Then a vacancy occurred in the benefice and the abbot again imped~d, but the
executors of Bigot brought a dariein presentment and the abbot pleaded an attaint pend·
ing, but it was held that this attaint did not affect the conclusiveness of the judgment
until it was actually reversed, and the presentation was awarded to the executors with·
.out taking an assize.
.. Y. B. l·:> Edward II (Sel. Soc.) u3.
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of law even alleging its falsity, and therefore where wager of
law had been allowed as a defense but not waged and thereupon
in the same case the parties joined issue and went to the country and
then •the wager of law was made and judgment had, no trial could
take p1ace by a jury upon the issue joined, because the one judg·ment might contradict the other.65 There never was any question
but that the heir of the party affected could bring attaint, and by
statute the rule was e"'-i:ended so as to enable the reversioner to
bring attaint upon a verdict against the life tenant.66
Under the Yorkist kings (r46o-1485) more .liberality was shown
toward the attaint and a greater harshness toward trial juries, and
this is noticeable in the strictness with which the verdicts were construed with reference to the pleadings. Thus the faw was that if one
pleads a right of common as appendant to land and this is traversed and put in issue and upon the trial he makes proof of a right
of. common time out of mind, saying nothing as to land, he has
proven a right of common in gross and the defendant shall have
attaint. Similarly, says the Justice, "if I and my ancestors have en. joyed a rent time out of mind as foresters of such and such a forest
and I bring an assize for the rent, alleging seisin of such a rent,' and
the seisin as alleged is traversed or denied and I make title that I
-and my ancestors have h·ad the rent time out of mind, without showing that we had it as foresters, and it be found against the defendant, lie shall maintain the attaint ;" and the same law is applied to a
rent service alleged to be out of land and proof of a rent by prescription without showing that the land is,held by it.67 Here we
note the good old rule now applied in indictments, that the allegation
must be proven as laid; and if a thing be described with particularity,
it must be proven in all tha,t particularity. It is apparent that if a
jury is to apply this rule on penalty of being held criminals if they
violate it, the strictness of law has become rigorous injustice. But
these cases are important to show that now proof of title is being
made in court by evidence to the jury and the evidence given to the
trial jury is being proven before the attainting jury to show that the
trial jury made a false oath.
· . At this time, too, it was decided that the right to an attaint as to a
verdict concerning land claimed by a fee tail, descended with the
land. The release of the person prejudiced by the attaint could not
ea Y. B. 2-3 Edward II (Set. Soc.) 138. This assumes that no attaint could be
brought against the witnesses in wager of law.
eo Thayer, Treat. Evid. 148.
81 Y. B. 10 Edward IV, 17.

THE ATTAINT

affect the heir's right to bring it,08 since the tenant in tail could not
alienate the land to the prejudice of the heir in. tail. The right to
pursue the remedy survived to any surviving plaintiff in attaint.
Even in the case of husband and wife, the right survived to the wife
and did not pass to the husband's executors.60 The old rule of assigning the false oath on the whole verdict without particulars, was
steadily upheld. It was sufficient to say that the jury made a false.
oath in everything which they said against the person alleging the
false oath,70 and the court carefully discriminatesi between attaint
and writ of error, for it is not sufficient in error to assign in omnibus
erratum est, but some certain matter should be assigned. Our law
as -to specifications of error has a long and illustrious descent.
To the proposition now urged upon the Yorkist judges, that the
effect of the attamt ought not to go further than necessary and ·ought
simply ·to reverse a judgment founded upon a verdict which has not
changed the possession, a majority of the Common Bench, among
whom was Littleton, the author of the Tenures, held that the verdi~t of the twenty-four attainting the former verdict required the
judgment to be entered that would hav~ been first entered if the
jury had found:truly. 71
It was about this time (I470) that Chief Justice Fortescue was
writing his book De Laudibu-.s Legum Angliae. It may be called the
swan song of the old trial by.the jury as witnesses. Already, as we
have seen by the cases as to correspondence of allegation and proof,
evidence is being offered before the jury. But this change had come
imperceptibly and men then, just as now, failed to see the inevitable·
results of a great change. Fortescue has left us a very noble and eloquent plea for the old system. He points out as one of the advan• Y.' B. 14 E;dward III, 41. Technically, this judgment is correct, for a tenant in
tail by collusion could let the verdict go against him and then release bis right to bring
attaint and absolutely bar the heir in tail as to the land.
• Y. B. Mich. 46 E;dward III, D. 5. 'l'bis case is noted in Statham's Abridgement.
And here let me dra\v attention to the translation of Statham by Margaret Center
Klingelsmitb. The edition is a marvel of industry and scholarly devotion, even if one
cannot always agree with the translation ·or the notes.
11 Y. B. 6 E;dward IV, 5, Fitzh. Attaint. 'l·
n Y. B. 8 E;dward IV, 8, Fitzh. Attaint, 8. Littleton, Needham and another justice
held where a man brought a formedon and the tenant pleaded a release and the jury
found for the release, that although the verdict did not change the possession, yet upon
a verdict in attaint as to the release that the jury made a false oath, the demandant
shall recover the land; and so in debt, if a man is barred of his debt alleged and he
assigns a false oath on the verdict and the attaint. finds with him, he shall recover his
debt. But Danby, a great name in English law, and another judge said that the judgment on the first action was that the demandant take nothing wherefore he shall be
restored to his cause of action but -not to the land for he has not lost it. But the
others said as before.
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tages o'f jury trial in determining questions of fact over the method.
of the civil law, where the tribunal hears witnesses and where two
witnesses to a fact are sufficient, that any litigant can find ·two men
who are ready, for fear or favor, to go counter to the truth in anything. He scouts the idea: that oral testimony can be relied upon,
as compared with the English jury of witnesses, twelve in number,
choseri by ~ public official from among men of property of the vicinage, who are subject to challenge and ac.t under the sanction of an
oath, whose verdict may be attainted if untrue by the verdict of
twenty-four of the leading men in the vicinity. He says that on a
trial witnesses may be heard, but the jury know all that the witnesses can tell •them, and he does not add what he no doubt knew,
that the English law discouraged the production of witnesses. 72
The early history of the jury system affords a study of the inevitable tendency to overload an efficient remedy. · 'Vhen the assize
was invented every thinking person was disgusted with trial by witnesses produced by the party. As a judge in an early Year Book
says the compurgating witnesses were rascals. The contempt for
witness testimony long endured in English law and is nowhere
shown more strongly than in Fortescue's De Lazedibus. The assize
substitilted twelve sworn and -indifferent witnesses who knew the
facts. The remedy was. theoretically confined to proof of events
supposed to be within the knowledge of the twelve men summoned.
The ~ensions to other remedies..were at first confined to proof of
such events. Bracton shows that the reason for the degrees in dis-'
seisin was that the jury would not know facts so remote as those
beyond the degrees. But the legislature paid no attention to ·this
obvious consideration and extended the twelve witnesses to the most
remote happenings. The functions of the jury became so overloaded
that it could no longer respond as witnesses but must make inquiries
of other witnesses. The transformation was assisted by the growing
complexity of human· life and intercourse and growing trade and
commerce. The results were (I) all sorts of wrong influences exerted upon the jury, and, (2) the production of witnesses in co11rt.
These results were actually the creation of a wholly anomalous and
irresponsible body which was not bound by the testimony although
it received testimony. The attaint was also overloaded and beca~e
unworkable. The trouble with the jury system for over two hundred years was not that people were necessarily less honest than
they are today, but that the jury of tw~lve witnesses was called upon
to perform a task wholly unsuited to its method of selection and de'12

See

10 Ill~ois

Law Rev. 549, 550.
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liberation. We can plainly see today that as soon as the jury began
to hear evidence as a judicial body, its function as a witnessing body,
pure and simple, through the knowledge of its members was .no
longer being performed. As a judicial body its deliberations required stric.t control by the court, not by another jury of twentyfour. Still the law continued to regard the jury in two wholly irreconcilable ways and it was asked to perform a task for which it
was never designed. This was the actual situation when Chief Justice Fortescue was sounding the praises of the old jury of witnesses.
The doom of the practice of attaint is evident, though it took
many years to find it out. The production of evidence to a jury had
begun with written evidence. The entering wedge was shown by
the ruling that the jurors could not be attainted for relying upon
the witnesses to a deed. Now came a ruling that in attaint where a
party gives in evidence a record which was not shown to the petty
jury, it will be a good plea for the petty jury on trial for a false
oath to say that this record was not shown to them, for they will not
be driven to take notice of something not shown to them.73 This is
the end of the attaint. No longer did the twenty-four come to say
what was the fact and to pass upon the first jury's verdict only incidentally. Now they are trying the jury as a judicial body which
hears and passes upon evidence. The staple of litigation has changed
to the 'minds of men. Life is no longer so simple as before. Commerce and trade, the growing wealth of the community, the abolition of villenage, the growth of towns and cities, have made life
complicated. No longer is litigation concerned with matters that all
the neighbors know and of which the jury must speak truly at their
peril. Now the neighbors have become a body who hear evidence
and decide from the evidence. The attaint jury was now itself
hearing evidence and from that evidence trying the mental processes
of the petty jury and deciding whether they acted reasonably on the
evidence which they had.
The law, which is always more reasonable than it seems, recognized the obvious change to a certain extent. The judges could not
shut their eyes to what was happening in court before them. They
could not hold a jury guilty of perjury when they had seen that jury
listening to conflicting evidence and trying to ascertain the truth.
The courts soon were holding that the plaintiff in attaint cannot give
more in evidence to the attainting jury than he presented to the first
jury. He cannot bring fonvard additional witnesses. Yet, on the
other hand, the issue being yet clouded with the idea that the at11

Fitzh. Attaint 9; Y. B. Hi!. 7 Edward IV,

29.
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tainting jury are passing upon the actual fact, the defendant in attaint may offer more evidence than was given to the first jury in
order to show that the first verdict was correct. The law is always
more practical than logical and ~as driven to a wholly illogical compromise. It allowed the parties to try the truth of the first verdict,
but tied the hands of one of the parties; this it did in deference to
its other and wholly contradictory theory, that it was trying the fairness of the first jury's'mental processes. Judges were now telling
the twenty-four gentlemen on the attainting jury that they must look
to the eVidence given to the first jury, and if that was sufficient to
justify their verdict, it was immaterial what the truth was. This
was no doubt the law; but it is a curious thing to say to a jury which
was asked by the writ and sworn by their oath, to find the truth as
to the actual fact. u The court in effect charged that the oath was
immaterial. In order that the law be co~sistent, the attainting jury
should have been asked to say, first, was the verdict true and, second, was it arrived at reasonably. If not true but arrived at reasonably, the judgment should have been reversed but the jury acquitted.
This obvious solution did not occur to the judges of that age, for
. the reason that they talked only in tennsof precedent and they could
not understand the changes that had come over the jury trial. It
may be that the liberal minded lawyers of the Renaissance would
have· remedied the matter, but with the advent of the Stuart Kings,
the sanctity of the jury became a political issue and it triumphed with
the downfall of the· Stuarts.
As soon as the- jury trial changed its character, there was apparent a practical difficulty in the administration of the law. The attainting juries would not convict the petty juries. "The gentlemen,"
says Sir Thomas Smith, "will not meet to slander and deface the
honest yeomen, their neighbors, * * * and if (they) do appear,
gladlier will they confirm the first sentence." 111 This was bound to be
so, but all the time the clamor went up to parliament against the
gross and horrible perjuries of the petty jurors, from men who were
losing cases. .The courts gave a remedy for setting aside a verdict
for misconduct of the jury after they had assembled in court.76 but
the only :r.emedy for other misconduct was the attaint. At last the
wise men in parliament reached the conclusion that the severity of
the punishment was deterring attainting juries from finding the
n Ro1£e v. Hampden, I Dyer 53b. The Justice Shelley in this case was an ancestor
of the poet Shelley and seems to have had some of his curious contradictions in reason·
ing•
.,. Quoted Thayer, Treat. ~id. 153.
" See 10 Illinois I.aw Rev. 553, note :z5.
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petty juries guilty of a false oath, and a law was passed as a temporary expedient, continued by later acts, revived under Henry VIII
and made permanent under Elizabeth, for lightening the punishment
to a fine. 77
,
But the fault was not in the punishment, for the attaint became
less and less workable. The fact was that the tribunal of twentyfour, when it came to a question of hearing evidence and passing
upoµ the reasonableness of the petty jury's conduct, was not a proper
1:ribunal. They would naturally assume that the petty jury acted
fairly, to the best of its knowledge and mental capacity and since
they could not find the issue differently, .without convicting the petty
jurors of a crime, they allowed the one issue to outweigh the other.
Only in cases of manifest corruption would there. be a chance for a
verdict for the plaintiff in attaint. Yet the technical rules were made
all the more stringent, so that the greatest lawyer of Elizabeth's reign goes so far in his reports as to say that ·the attaiµt was
such that a jury could be convicted though every word in their verdict was true.78 The courts extended the remedy as far as they
could by holding cases within the equity of the statute, giving .the
attaint against the heir and against the executors of the tenant of
the land under the verdict, thus reversing older cases.79
But notwithstanding that· juries were hearing evidence as judicial
bodies, the courts kept on saying that a jury might find the facts of
its own knowledge. Yet at the same time, the courts were fining
them for finding contrary to the evidence given in court. The judges
were hopelessly entangled in the maze of the tiro conflicting theories, for as against the practice of fining juries, it was urged that for
an incorrect verdict the attaint lay and that it was a·remedy. The
courts, as they often have done, tried to ride two horses going in
exai;tly opposite directions. The fact was that the judges under
Henry VII and Henry VIII were bewildered in the presence of a
phenomenon which had taken all the life out of tpe attaint. As long
as the jury was considered as finding the facts from their own
n Stat. LI Henry VII, cap. 24; 23 Henry VII, cap. 3; 13 Eliz., cap. 25.
n Plowd. 292. The case he cites is one in 49 Henry VJ, whcre an abbot, as parson
of a certain church, held an annuity by prescription in right of his parsonage. He sued
for it and counted on the annuity as due to him and his predecessor abbots by prescription not naming himself as parson. The prescription was travcrsed and he proved an
annuity by prescription, but not due to him as parson. The jury found for him and was
attainted. Plowden is wrong. The jury found contrary to the fact alleged, for the abbot
on the record could have brought another action for the annuity owed to him as parson.
Even great lawycrs like Plowden are sometimes found slumbering.,
·
n According to Plowden, 86, citing 6 and 7 Edward VI, attaint statutes are not
to be extended by equity of the statute. Contra, Moore, 17, note ·6o, citing the Easter
term of the 3 Elizabeth.
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knowledge, the courts were powerless to revise their finding, but
must use the attaint jury. Perchance, the jury knew much more
than was spoken in court and only an attaint jury could tell this .
.But now -stepped in the court of chancery; with its jurisdiction for
granting a new trial of an action at law. It had no difficulty in acting upon the assumption that the evidence that had been given in
court was all the evidence that the jury had. At last, in the presence of this competing jurisdiction, stimulated by the jealousy felt
both by judges and the common law bar against the equity courts,
which were stealing so-much of their jurisdiction and emoluments, a
great light burst upon the common law courts, and, under the Commonwealth, they began to grant new trials. But the development had
been such that the courts, in applying the new trial proceeding, went
only as far as the equity courts and granted a new trial without substituting the proper judgment.
It needs no analysis to show that the passing upon the verdict by
a motion for a new trial, presupposes that the jury's action is to be
judged as· if the court had before itseif the evidence given in open
court and no other, and the rulii:ig is to be made thereby. Granted
that the jury have acted upon fl:!cts a~d knowledge not disclosed in
the ·evidence but known to some of them, the motion for a new trial
be<!omes at once from a logical standpoint an utter absurdity and the
courts are back where they were under Henry VIII and Henry VII,
when they were trying to make the practice of attaint cover two absolutely contradictory theQries of a jury's verdict. The attaint perished because too great a work was unthinkingly put upon it. Yet
such is the persistence of error in repeating the cantilena of the 1aw,
that Chief Justice Vaughn in his immortal judgment in Bushell's
case,so which .is one of the bulwarks of our liberties, gave ·as the
controlling reason why a court could not puni~h a jury for bad judgment ot a perverse verdict without evidence of actual misconduct,
the wholly absurd reason that the jury found a verdict from their
own knowledge, as well as from the evidence. Vaughn was still so
entangled in the two contradictory theories as to assert in one breath
that a juryman is not a witness because he "swears to what he can
infer and conclude from the testimony" and in the next breath that
the law supposes him able to decide the case, although no evidence
whatever be given, and therefore he is a witness. As a reasoning animal, the learned Chief Justice must have come out of "Bedlam.'.11 But for. two hundred years this opinion has continued to be
80

11

6 State Tr. 99!); Vaughn's Rep. 135.
Thayer in Treat. Evid. 169, speaks of "the keen arguments" in Vaughn's opinion l
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repeated and today a vast mass of precedent could be cited against
giving to courts the power upon granting a new trial to enter the
proper judgment.
.
As soon as it was determined that the jury were a judicial body
passing upon the evidence given before them in open court, the
courts began their constmctive work in creating that vast body of
the rules of evidence, whereby it could be assured that juries would
be subjected only to the influence of evidence proper for them to
consider. It is more than a coincidence, it is an hil'!torical necessity,
that our rules of evidence date from the period when the jury became a judicial body' and the granting of new trials began.
True it is that the rule as to the sanctity of the written document
against attack by oral evidence, comes out of the Middle Ages. But"
this is so because, whether a jury be witnesses or judges, the written
document must govern the evidence.· Just as when the jury were·
witnesses making up the verdict from their own knowledge and
what they could gain by private inquiry, they were guarded against
improper influences out of court by the strict rules agai1,1st champerty, embracery and maintenance,b 2 so after I655~ when they had
become judges of the evidence, rules were necessary to prevent them
from being influenced by improper suggestions made in court.· ·
And now to the moral that is to be extracted from this long tale.
Today the greatest evil in the administration of the law is, first, that
the judge, during the trial, has not enough control over the jury;
and, second, after the verdict, has not power to correct it, by entering the proper verdict and thus ending the litigation with power in
the Appellate Court to review the ruling and to make the proper
judgment in the case. If this were possible a great part of the
appellate jurisdiction, which is taken up with passing upon questions
of admission and exclusion of evidence and of instructions to juries
in lower courts, would at once be swept away. Upon this question
the history of attaint is very instructive. It is the substance of
things that we must look to, not the form. Once our courts of common law, by a summary process, could correct a mistake in the finding of a jury and at once substitute the proper finding and judgment
thereon. This power the common law ought never to have lost, but
in our progress toward free government, the sanctity of the jury's
verdict became exaggerated out of all proportion to its merits. '!'he
12 See 10 Illinois Law Rev. 552, for the reasons for the rules against champerty,
maintenance and embracery. But it is to be said that the law today punishes any one
who attempts to talk to or influence a jury out of court, just as it did when the jury
were witnesses. But under the old rule a party could go to the jury out of court and
state to them his evidence. In no other way could lie tell the jury his facts.
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sanctity of the verdict served a great and useful purpose in the struggle for liberty and free institutions, which are more important -than
any. procedure, but now the day has come when democratic government must furnish proof of its right to exist by furnishing justice
according to law. Aristotle long ago said that governments exist
for noble deeds, and the noblest and highest duty that the government can perform is that of furnishing to its citizens justice that is
given in accordance with law that is equal for all. It is no answer
to this demand upon govern.ment to say that ·every litigant has the
constitutional right in a law case to have a jury make an incorrect
finding on the issue, that cannot be corrected except by the long and
.expensive process of a new trial, which again may eventuate in another incorrect finding. It is giving weight enough to the verdict
for the court to say that it will not set aside the verdict except when
against the weight of the evid~nce.
JOHN M. ZANE.
Chicago, Illinois. 1

